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This thesis examines the political autonomy campaigns of subnational entities. 
Subnational entities may be defined as political entities located below the state level 
whose members are connected through historic territories and socio-cultural identities.  
 
Catalonia and the Basque Country are presented as the two case studies of this thesis 
and are approached with a comparative framework. From the outset, an examination 
of the Westphalian state structure of the international political system is provided, 
with particular emphasis on the political position of subnational entities. The thesis 
then utilises the contemporary phenomenon of international migration and explores 
the international immigration trends that affect Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
The potential tension at the intersection of international immigration and subnational 
autonomy campaigns is analysed, guided by the question of whether Catalonia or the 
Basque Country approach foreign immigration as a hindrance or a help to their 
political autonomy campaigns. The integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country are then assessed, as well as an analysis of the alternative political relations 
which Catalonia and the Basque Country have formed based upon the issue of foreign 
immigrant integration. 
 
This thesis finds that although the sovereign state structure continues to dominate the 
international political system, Catalonia and the Basque Country demonstrate how 
subnational autonomy campaigns continue to be pursued. Furthermore, this thesis 
finds that Catalonia and the Basque Country have recently utilised the issue of foreign 
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 1
The state is commonly conceived of as the primary unit by which the public 
understands and engages in political order. Those who are citizens of states vote, pay 
taxes and are bound to abide by civil law. States, in turn, act as their own political 
entities in the international sphere, engaging in official dialogue, signing treaties and 
representing the populations for whom they are responsible. Often, the state is 
regarded as the sole, legitimate authority of political power within a given territory. 
States have come to inhabit the popular imagination as something unified, something 
unequivocal. There are others, though, who would vehemently contend that the state 
is neither unified nor legitimate; those who would proclaim the modern state a 
hegemonic force which has asserted its dominance over all cultural, economic and 
political units of a territory. Some would go so far as to pronounce the state an 
illegitimate foreign invader which has actively sought to purge the population of 
recusant groups in order to advance the goal of national homogenisation.   
 
While the modern state system continues to dominate the prevailing political 
understanding, there exist those who critically question the state as the essential 
sovereign. Such critics may be regarded as national minorities, as they identify with 
subdominant groups within the national territory. These national minorities are 
commonly regarded as irrational, acrimonious extremists who live in a bygone 
political reality. What is significant, however, is that though the formalisation of many 
Western states occurred over two centuries ago, there remain populations of 
'dissidents' who continue to question the rightfulness of the current sovereign state 
and who still resist the state's intention of national homogenisation.  
     
Throughout history there have been groups who unmistakably belong to political 
entities which are deemed politically illegitimate within the international political 
sphere. Some authors label these groups as 'stateless nationalities'
1
, others as 'historic 
nationalities'
2
 and yet others as 'ethnoregionalists'
3
. While each term connotes its own 
meaning, each term draws attention to historic, ethnic and non-state identities which 
characterize these groups. In this thesis, the term 'subnationalists'
4
 is used to describe 
                                                 
1
 See Keating (2001). 
2
 See Schrijver (2006). 
3
 See DeWinter & Cachafeiro (2002). 
4
 The author uses the term ‘subnational’ because, in comparison with the political competencies of the    
national entity, the competencies of Catalonia and the Basque Country are, essentially, below the state. 
 2
those populations who identify with a political entity which, firstly, does not have 
sovereign state status and, secondly, can be conceptualised as below the territorial and 
political scope of the sovereign state. Thus, this thesis classifies these political entities 
with which subnationalists identify as 'subnations', as they are situated beneath the 
commonly used phrase 'nation-state', in terms of territorial scope, political clout and 
administrative authority.  
 
For centuries, subnational entities have been a thorn in the side of states because of 
their demand for extended political autonomy. Moreover, the appeal of and 
connection to subnational autonomy campaigns
5
  have failed to fade away. Questions 
over the fate of subnational sovereignty and the rights of subnational peoples have 
been raised periodically over time (Keating, 2001) and though some issues have been 
addressed, the full extent of the subject has yet to be realised.  
 
This thesis aims to highlight a recent point of contention for subnational autonomy 
movements: the phenomenon of international immigration. As subnational entities 
have traditionally invested in the preservation of their distinctive identities and the 
maintenance of political relationships with their respective states over time, relatively 
foreseeable political approaches have been developed. However, as the current era of 
globalisation has increased the international movement of goods, services and 
technology, so too has it generated an immense rise in the movement of peoples. 
Caught between sustaining political aspirations of autonomy within the bounds of 
historical borders and maintaining an effective relationship with the state, subnational 
entities have become further confronted with the challenge of the arrival of diverse 
immigrant populations; groups of people whom neither share a common culture with 
nor a political understanding of newly-settled subnational entities. This thesis, then, 
explores the phenomena of subnational autonomy campaigns alongside the current 
trends of foreign immigration
6
.     
                                                                                                                                            
Indeed, Colino (2009) states that the “autonomous communities possess a very limited role in the 
reform of the national federal constitution …” (p. 263). While Catalonia and the Basque Country have 
significant autonomy within a range of social and administrative competencies, their formal 
competencies are, ultimately, of lower status in relation to the state level. Hence the prefix sub-.  
5
 Subnational autonomy can be understood as the degree of self-governance allotted by the state to a 
 subnational entity which may include jurisdictional rights of culture, defence, international relations,  
education, language, tax and policy participation within international the policy institutions such as the  
EU. See Roller & Sloat (2002). 
6
 Foreign immigration can be defined as an incoming 
 3
 
In order to engage more fully in this political intersection, two subnational case 
studies will be utilised: Catalonia and the Basque Country. These two subnational 
entities have had long histories of appealing to the state of Spain to work towards 
furthering their political autonomy aspirations.  Chapter 2 of this thesis outlines a 
concise history of Catalonia and the Basque Country, lending particular attention to 
Catalan and Basque subnational identities and the formal and informal competencies 
which they currently operate.  
 
The arrival of foreign immigrants into subnational territories poses both a theoretical 
and practical challenge to subnational entities. However, immigration is a vast area of 
research, even when limited to the contexts of Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
Many authors have studied the trends of immigration within the bounds of these 
historic territories
7
 and have concentrated their research topics on rates of 
immigration, the contextual background of specific immigration flows and 
subnational populations’ perceptions of foreign immigrant populations.  Furthermore, 
research on Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy efforts have largely 
disregarded foreign immigration trends as having any relation to subnational 
autonomy campaigns. For example, many authors who write about European 







 and minority rights
11
. Taking into 
account the shifting demographics within Catalonia and the Basque Country, Chapter 
3 examines the immigrant populations of Catalonia and the Basque Country by 
recounting the historical experience of immigration in these subnational entities and 
by exploring contemporary immigration rates. Chapter 3 also evaluates how Catalan 
and Basque subnational identities have been affected in times of high foreign 
immigration trends.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
receiving state and, for visa purposes, are not nationals originating from European Union (EU) states 
(Favell, 2009).  
7
 Notably, Conversi (1997) and Shafir (1995).  
8
 Supranational settings may be the EU or the United Nations (UN), for example. Refer to Downs 
(2002), Guibernau (2006), Jeffery (2000), Roller (2004) and Squires (1999). 
9
 Refer to Davis (2009). 
10
 European regionalism may be understood as a process of increased regional interdependence through 
the creation of institutions made to increase regional cooperation and integration (Downs, 2002).   
11
 Refer to Kymlicka (2006) and Sasse (2006). 
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The arrival of foreign immigrants to subnational entities can be viewed as two 
separate processes. Firstly, foreign immigration can reveal a lack of territorial control 
of subnational entities, which allows immigrant movements to enter subnational 
territories without full limitation. Secondly, foreign immigration can challenge the 
continuation of subnational autonomy campaigns as subnational entities may become 
overwhelmed by the sheer scale of foreign immigration trends. There exists the risk, 
then, that the significant numbers of foreign immigrants could threaten Catalan and 
Basque autonomy campaigns, as this new demographic lacks the cultural and 
historical ties to the subnational entities, ties which Catalonia and the Basque Country 
depend on so deeply for the continuation of their autonomy campaigns.  
 
In examination of how Catalonia and the Basque Country conceptualise foreign 
immigration trends in relation to their subnational autonomy campaigns, Chapter 4 
explores the ways by which foreign immigrants have affected the stratagem of 
Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy efforts by analysing two sets of primary 
research sources. The first research source derives from the most recent integration 
policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country, which are examined using Durkheim’s 
‘national ideal’ theory. The second research source comes from a collection of 
strategic relationships which Catalonia and the Basque Country have recently formed, 
at both horizontal and vertical levels
12
, under the theme of immigrant integration, 
which are analysed using Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) ‘venue shopping’ theory. 
These strategic relationships will reveal how Catalonia and the Basque Country have 
used the touchstone issue of immigration as a formal competency by which further 
subnational autonomy is sought.  
 
This research is important for two main reasons. Firstly, this thesis contributes to a 
lacuna in the academic literature; the intersection of the globalised phenomenon of 
migration and the fate of subnational autonomy campaigns. Furthermore, this thesis 
may serve as a valuable framework by which to research further contemporary issues 
at the intersection of subnational autonomy campaigns. By utilising contemporary, 
touchstone issues as a theoretical lens, further interpretations of subnational autonomy 
                                                 
12 
Horizontal political relationships may be understood as the relations between subnational entities, 
whereas vertical political relationships may be understood as relations between subnational and 
national entities or relations between subnational and supranational entities. These terms are discussed 
in depth in Chapter 4.   
 5
campaigns may be examined.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis applies the issue of foreign immigration as a lens through 
which to assess contemporary political strategies of Catalan and Basque autonomy 
campaigns. The thesis finds that Catalonia and the Basque Country have used the 
issue of foreign immigration as a way of strengthening their integration policies and 
increasing their alternative political relations, with the aim of intensifying their 
informal political competencies. While formal competencies of immigration policy 
remain solely under the jurisdiction of the state
13
, Catalonia and the Basque Country 
have been able to substantially develop their informal political competencies, 
including increased institutional measures at the subnational level of advanced 
immigrant integration policies and increased venue shopping practices. Finally, the 
thesis posits that the expansion of informal political competencies has increased the 
subnational autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque Country and that by examining 
these informal competencies, testament is given to the rise and changing tactics of 

















                                                 
13 
As per the Spanish Constitution (1978). 
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Chapter 2 - Subnationalism 
 
Catalonia and the Basque Country have engaged in their respective subnational 
autonomy campaigns for many hundreds of years
14
. However, in order to conduct a 
thorough exploration of Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy campaigns, an 
understanding of the modern international political structure is necessary. This chapter 
begins with an examination of the Westphalian state model, offering a basic overview 
of how subnational entities came to be perceived after the inception of this modern 
state system. Next, a review of the general aims and strategies which subnational 
autonomy campaigns employ is presented. An outline of the historical experiences of 
Catalonia and the Basque Country within the state of Spain is then offered, including 
a description of the contrasting subnational identities of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country. Following on, the political structure of the Spanish state is briefly illustrated, 
lending particular attention to the inherently asymmetrical structure of Spain’s 
autonomous community system. Finally, a summary of the political competencies 
allotted by the state to Catalonia and the Basque Country is outlined. By venturing 
from an examination of the organisation of the modern international political structure 
to the more specific facets of Catalan and Basque subnational identities and political 
competencies, this chapter presents the groundwork for understanding the historical 
and political realities of Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
 
 
A Westphalian world 
 
The Treaty of Westphalia (1648)
15
 is commonly cited as the precedent for the 
sovereign state system, whereby each political entity, and hence the entire population 
within each political entity, is ruled by a sovereign. The sovereign, then, may be 
understood as the centralised source of political power within a sovereign state, and 
each state’s territory must be respected by the other sovereigns within this 
international political structure. Though the aim of the Treaty of Westphalia was to put 
                                                 
14
 Catalonia has been cited as having begun its subnational autonomy campaign in 1716, in response to 
the inception of the Nueva Planta, and for the Basque Country in 1876 with the abolition of the fuero 
system (Shafir, 1995). 
15 
The Treaty of Westphalia is the popular term for the collection of the two peace treaties of 
Osnabruck and Munsters (1648), respectively.  
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an end to the religious wars that raged throughout Europe in the 17
th
 century, another, 
if not more powerful, occurrence resulted in effect of this treaty. The Treaty of 
Westphalia created the political precedent for an international political system which 





While the effect of the Treaty of Westphalia is commonly associated with the modern 
international political structure, also instrumental has been its influence in the 
domestic political sphere. As the treaty resulted in establishing the normative political 
principles in the international sphere, also powerful was the notion of a single political 
sovereign ruling over a given territory (McGrew, 2006). This treaty, then, created a 
domestic political norm wherein a sole sovereign would attain political legitimacy at 
the international level. Political campaigns at the domestic level rapidly unfolded 
throughout the following centuries, whereby the cultural, economic and political 
realities of vast territories and populations were targeted by homogenising efforts
17
 of 
the sovereign state (Anderson, 1991). The logic followed that in the aim of creating 
reputable political order, modern states needed to be established. These modern state-
building projects often accompanied the active eradication of subnational entities, 
often with repressive measures such understood as a necessary to create a modern 
sovereign state. Accordingly, local identities became differentiated from the state's 
ideal and became perceived as dissident. Thus, subnational entities, and those who 
identified with them, became relative enemies of the state, in that they obstructed the 
state's objective of a homogenous political territory and population.   
 
As the political imagination became informed by the Westphalian, state-centred 
model, this structure, in effect, reinforced the power of the states with the paradigm of 
political legitimacy warranted solely to states. Therefore, a cyclical pattern emerged 
whereby sovereign states became the normative political entities in the international 
sphere, states then pursued nation-building campaigns in order to achieve sovereign 
authority over national territories to attain sovereign state status and lower-level 
political entities (e.g. national entities), which lacked the necessary might in resisting 
                                                 
16
 Wherein the sovereign state became the recognised actor in the international political sphere, so too  
was a single sovereign model established in the domestic political spheres.  
17
 Homogenising efforts have regularly been employed by states to standardise the cultural, economic  
and social realities of populations within state territories. 
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states' homogenising efforts, were suppressed and politically disregarded. Hence, the 
political power of subnational entities was regarded as illegitimate by the sovereign 
state and continued to be side-lined, while the populations who identified with these 
entities continued to feel unrepresented by, if not hostile towards, the sovereign state 
(Brightly, 1999). 
 
Absent from the conventional understanding of the Westphalian state model is the 
assortment of entities which had significant political influence in the Treaty of 
Westphalia’s endorsement which offered substantial support to the treaty’s passing. Of 
those who signed the treaty and are described as sovereigns within the treaty are; 
Ferdinand III of Habsburg
18
, the prince of Suabia
19
, Louis XIV of France, the duke of 
greater Silesia
20
 and the senator of Venice, to name a few. These representatives, who 
within the Treaty of Westphalia are acknowledged as sovereigns, give testament to the 
capability of an international political system characterised by diverse political 
entities, as these sovereign entities were characterized by subnational, national and 
supranational political realities. However, this very treaty created the political norm 
whereby only states were held as the legitimate political entities within the modern 
political system. 
 
The contemporary political imagination, then, has forgotten about the political 
legitimacy and historical relevance of a system of diverse political entities when the 
Treaty of Westphalia is reference in defense of the modern sovereign state system. 
Likewise, the Treaty of Westphalia, by leaving precedence for the modern political 
norms, works as the normative text to dismiss the political aspirations of diverse 
political entities, such as the autonomous aspirations of subnational entities. Thus, 
while those addressed in the Treaty of Westphalia were more often representatives 
from suprantional and subnational entities than national entities, this document has 
shaped the norm of the international, state-centric political system and has informed 
the pursuits of countless state-building projects. The diverse political realities of the 
17
th
 century, then, lie in stark contrast to the contemporary political structure of the 
                                                 
18 
At the time of the treaty’s signing, Ferdinand III of Habsburg was the emperor of the Holy Roman 
Empire.  
19
 A territory which is presently located in Baden-Wurttemberg lander of Germany.    
20
 A territory which is presently makes up a region spanning southwestern Poland, eastern Germany 
and northern Czech Republic. 
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international system and the principles taken from the Treaty of Westphalia have, and 
continue to, act as a barrier to the political aspirations of subnational entities.  
 
 
The persistence of subnational entities 
 
Historically, subnational entities have played a significant role in the configuration of 
political landscapes. However, with the advent of the sovereign state model, 
subnational entities have been subjected to domestic forms of colonisation. The most 
prolific among international colonisers
21
 typically carried out internal homogenising 
activities before engaging in the international colonization campaigns. Thus, while 
many colonialist states have been popularly imagined as having a unified identity, 
they in fact were the most ardent of colonisers in their domestic sphere. Yet, although 
the actions of states to homogenise their domestic political territories and populations 
were vast in scale, local identities persisted. These local identities, which have often 
been presented as thorns in the side of nation-state aspirations, have been addressed 
by authors in diverse reactions. Anderson (1991), for example, cites authors such as 
Hobsbawn and Weber who defended nation-building projects for the standardization 
of cultures within a nation-state. Other authors, however, have questioned how after 
so many centuries of state-directed standardisation policies, subnational identities 
have been able to persist. Anderson (1991) states that even with all the endeavors of 
central state governments, including unified language policies and standardised 
educational systems, diverse subnational identities have continued to exist in nearly 
every modern state.  
 
Political science authors direct to two theoretical bases for the persistence of 
subnational identities within modern sovereign states. Some authors draw attention to 
the legacy of historical injustice
22
 directed by sovereign states towards subnational 
entities. Often, social histories of past injustices are passed down throughout 
generations within subnationalist discourses. These historic, subnationalist discourses 
have been identified by several authors who interpret subnationalist discourses and 
                                                 
21
 For example, France, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK).  
22
 Historical injustice may be understood as those acts, perceived by subnational entities, which states  
have carried out in order to limit a subnation’s political autonomy, such as the prohibition of the use of  
a subnational language or the direct removal of subnational political institutions. 
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find that each subnation’s historic discourse varies on a gradient of how 
antagonistically
23
 the sovereign state is perceived. Other authors, such as Barber, go 
further and assert that subnationalist identities are archaic forms of culturo-political 
identities, which Barber deems illegitimate on all accounts and have no basis on 
platforms of historic injustice.  
 
Conversi (1995) describes an 'antagonistic' identity is an identity which is more often 
found in subnational populations who lack an obvious cultural distinction from the 
mainstream state’s culture. Those populations with strong 'antagonistic' identities tend 
to operate in societies characterized by social exclusivity and commonly have hostile 
sentiments towards outsiders
24
. Following on from subnational identities characterised 
by social exclusivity, is the high value placed on ethnic purity to which some 
subnational entities ascribe. Conversi (1997) and Shafir (1995) assert that some 
subnational entities are particularly lacking in cohesive cultural tools (such as a 
distinct language) and, thus, place a high value on the ethnic purity of the subnational 
entity’s population. Moreover, Barber (1992) finds these forms of subnational 
identities as archaic and resistant towards all forms of modernisation.  
 
The academic literature offers a further explanation to the continuation of subnational 
identities. Many authors point to specific cultural distinctions of some subnational 
identities as the reason for the persistence of subnational entities. Conversi (1997) 
judges language as the strongest marker of cultural distinction, which he claims helps 
to hold the subnational community together. Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font (2004) assert 
that a culture of civic participation is also a highly valuable subnational marker. In 
Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font's (2004) argument, the strength of local civic and cultural 
institutions relates to the engagement of the civil society, which in turn dictates the 
aptitude of subnational autonomy campaigns. This type of subnational identity is 
commonly found as being culturally secure enough to operate societies characterised 
by inclusivity, wherein the subnational entity is secure enough to operate in the 
modern world while maintaining its unique identity characteristics (Conversi, 1997, 
Shafir, 1995). 
                                                 
23
 ‘Antagonist’ identities may be defined as culturo-political identities which hold a strong point of  
difference with the sovereign state. 
24 
As a result of the legacy of internal colonisation, these groups are prone to antagonism towards most  
outsiders.   
 11
 
As subnational entities vary in identity, so too do they vary in political ambition. 
Indeed, McGarry, Keating & Moore (2006) explain that the political aspirations of 
subnational entities are manifold in nature, ranging from symbolic subnational 
movements to full-scale subnational succession. While political aspirations may be 
diverse, one common thread that narrates all subnational political campaigns is the 
goal of political recognition at the international level. A popular interpretation of this 
goal is the desire of subnational entities to have equal political standing with nations. 
Gottlieb (1993) labels this notion the 'nations plus states' model, wherein “... the state 
keeps the power over its territory but not necessarily over all the people or 
[sub]nations inhabiting its territory” (in Beylerian, 1995-96, p. 164). This new 
recognition of political sovereignty would distinguish sovereignty as the political 
representation of populations from territorial sovereignty. This model would allow the 
present state system to be extended to include “a system of nations and peoples that 
are not organised territorially into independent states” (Gottlieb, 1993, p. 36). While 
the 'nations plus states' supposition has been regularly cited in the academic literature, 
it is not abstract in nature. Indeed, Giordano & Roller (2002) explain how one of 
Catalonia's main political parties, the CiU
25
, aims for Catalonia to attain “... political 
and administrative autonomy within the Spanish state” (my emphasis, p. 105).  
 
The main aim of the 'nations plus states' model is for the international political 
community to pay official recognition to non-state political entities, such as 
subnational entities, so that these political entities may have political representation in 
international negotiations and equal participation in transnational organisations 
(Beylerian, 1995/1996). The importance of international political participation is also 
in line with Kerremans’ (1996) assertion that only by participation in decision-making 
networks can a political actor participate in and contribute to international political 
outcomes. Similarly, Nagel (2004) finds that Catalan leaders are, largely, keen to 
participate in EU policy-making and do not have an independence agenda. 
  
The way in which subnational entities campaign for their political aspirations is 
subject to their relationship with the central state, the coherence of the subnational 
                                                 
25
 The CiU is a subnationalist political party in Catalonia, established in 1980 and run, for many years, 
by Jordi Pujol. 
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population, as well as various other factors. Necessary in all functional subnational 
campaigns, though, is a unifying political stance holding subnational projects together 
and propelling them forward. This united position is often associated with particular 
subnational identities. Of course, subnational identities may derive from specific local 
values which give a subnational entity a point of difference from the state and guide it 
to seek enhanced political autonomy. These subnational identities, whether acting as a 
point of difference from the state or not, play an instrumental role in the direction of 
the political autonomy campaigns of each subnation. The next section will explore the 
historical backgrounds of Catalonia and the Basque Country, illustrating the particular 
identities which distinguish these subnational entities from the Spanish state. An 
understanding of these subnational identities will guide the reader in comprehending 
the history of immigration of Catalonia and the Basque Country and the different 
ways in which each subnation has intersected with immigrant populations.  
 
 
Catalan and Basque histories and identities within Spain 
 
For many centuries, the Iberian Peninsula existed as an amalgamation of several 





 centuries and a Moorish territory until the Reconquista in 1492, Castilian-
controlled Spain did not appear in any real substance until the monarchy of Queen 
Isabella and King Ferdinand II (Brighty, 1999). From 1492, Spain gained recognition 
as a modern state and quickly acquired sovereign state characteristics, such as active 
homogenising efforts in the subnational entities within the Spanish territory. By the 
early 18
th
 century, the Bourbon monarchy advanced a number of proclamations
26
 
dictating a more unified Spanish state (Conversi, 1997). However, while the state of 
Spain employed homogenising efforts aimed at constructing a centralised state, 
subnational entities enacted their own efforts to retain their socio-political identities. 
This section outlines concise histories of Catalonia and the Basque Country, lending 
particular attention to each subnational entities' cultural and political identities. 
 
Catalonia has endured a long history of campaigning for subnational autonomy. 
                                                 
26 
These proclamations are popularly known as the Nueva Planta.  
 13
Existing as an autonomous political entity in coexistence with numerous Iberian 
kingdoms for several centuries, Catalonia enjoyed a far-reaching reputation for its 
advanced mercantile society. Its progressive identity extended broadly and was 
responsible for influencing the cultural landscapes of the surrounding regions of 
northeastern Spain, as well as southern France, the Balearic Islands and Sardinia 
(Conversi, 1997).  
 
Catalan society was characterised by a unique language, customs, laws and wealth in 
the arts and literature. Furthermore, Catalonia has long been organised by advanced 
political institutions based on staunch democratic values and administrative systems. 
A relationship of partnership alongside Castile and other political entities within the 
Spanish territory (such as the Basque Country and Galicia) existed until 1716, when 
the Nueva Planta was declared (Conversi, 1997).  Issued by the first Bourbon 
monarch, Philip V, the Nueva Planta aimed to centralise the administration of the 
entire Spanish territory. More specifically, this decree aimed at eradicate subnational 
identities which had not fully conformed to Castilian hegemony. By banning the use 
of the Catalan language and its autonomous institutions, the Nueva Planta aimed at 
suppressing Catalan political autonomy
27
 and cultural identity
28
. For Catalonia, the 
domineering relationship from Castile onto Catalonia continued, on and off, until the 
death of Francisco Franco in 1975.  
 
In spite of the efforts to eradicate Catalan autonomy and identity, two main threads of 
Catalan identity can explain its cultural and political perseverance. The first thread is 
the strength of Catalonia's economy. Although, starting from the 18
th
 century, Madrid 
took over the administration and taxation of Catalan industrial efforts, Catalonia 
continued to be the industrial capital of Spain, maintaining a highly efficient and 
technologically advanced industrialised system (Newhouse, 1997). Not only had 
Catalonia's advanced economic and industrial base been the envy of central Spain, but 
a strong connection was created between Catalonia and the more industrially-
advanced northern Europe
29 
(Conversi, 1997; Giordano & Roller, 2002; Keating, 
                                                 
27
 For example, the shutting down of Catalan institutions and the overtaking of Catalonia’s 
administrative and tax systems (Conversi, 1997  Laitan, 1997; Shafir, 1995). 
28
 For example, a restriction on Catalan language in Catalonia's business and administrative sectors and  
prohibitions on the use of Catalan in the public sphere. 
29
 A connection whereby Catalans more similar to northern European both economically and culturally, 
 14
2001; Laitan, 1997). 
 
The second thread by which Catalan identity has been able to persevere through the 
attempted homogenisation efforts of the state of Spain is the continued usage of the 
Catalan language, through which Catalan cultural characteristics are believed to be 
transmitted (Eaude, 2007). From book burning to the enforcement of Castilian 
language in all municipal signs, subnational language eradication had been a common 
weapon used by the Spanish state against Catalan society (Conversi, 1997). However, 
Catalan is exceptional in that although it has always been a minority language within 
the Spanish state, it has maintained a high status in an exceedingly diglossic
30
 
environment. Thus, Catalan remained the predominant language in Catalonia and has 
remained that way; evidenced by current Catalan comprehension above 99% (Idescat, 
2010)
31
. For Catalonia, then, its language has been, and continues to be, the essential 
building-block of subnational identity (Conversi, 1995). 
 
Folch-Serra and Nogue-Font (2004) argue that through the entrenched engagement of 
Catalan civil society, cultural and political identities became important themes around 
which Catalan people united. Thus, Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font (2004) assert that 
“Catalan identity has been shaped through time by its civil society institutions” (p. 
157). Indeed, for the Catalan case, the subnationalist projects were driven through 
cultural institutions at the civil society level. The importance of cultural institutions 
became evident when the Spanish monarchy began abolishing Catalonia's political 
competencies, beginning in 1716 with the Nueva Planta. As Folch-Serra and Nogue-
Font (2004) explain, the activities of the cultural Renaixença
32
 of the 18
th
 century 
helped to promote a re-birth in Catalan culture through local institutions and civil 
society”. Indeed, Catalan subnational cultural activities were a key thread in keeping 
Catalan identity in existence throughout so many centuries of cultural and political 
oppression. 
                                                                                                                                            
compared with mainstream Spain.  
30
 Diglossia may be understood as the existence of two languages within a society, wherein one of the 
languages is of higher status (Conversi, 1997). 
31
 A 2009 census found that of the Catalan population, 99% understood the language, 95% spoke 
Catalan, 89% could read in Catalan and 76% could write in Catalan (Idescat, 2010). 
32
 The cultural Renaixença is a period in Catalan history (ranging from the early 18
th
 century to the mid 
20
th
 century) when Catalan language, arts and history were actively promoted by the intellectual elite 
and subnationalist leaders of Catalonia (Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font, 2004).  
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As Catalan civil society continuously engaged in autochthonous cultural activities, 
these social interactions acted as “... fully fledged bearers of [subnationalist] ideology, 
later [constituting] the ideological basis for a political movement of self-
determination” (Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font, 2004, p. 164). Thus, while cultural, 
linguistic and political activities in Catalonia were kept, for the most part, 
underground until the end of the Franco regime in 1975, these continuous 
autochthonous, underground activities sustained the political values of Catalonia.   
 
The Basque Country is a further subnational entity which has experienced a lengthy 
political autonomy campaign, although many
33
 would argue its journey has been 
considerably more complex than the Catalan case. The Basque territory is comprised 
of seven provinces, four of which are located in Spain and are collectively known as 
the Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre, and three of which are located in 
France, known collectively as the Northern Basque Country. This thesis explores only 
the subnational autonomous situation of the Basque Autonomous Community, which 
will be referred to throughout the thesis as the Basque Country. From the outset, then, 
the Basque subnation spans two modern states; a territorial situation which has little 
hope in ever garnering absolute political sovereignty. Furthermore, the Basque 
identity is of particular distinction, and has been dated back to the 7
th
 century 
(Conversi, 1997).  The unique cultural identity of the Basque has been traced by the 
Basque language, Euskara, which bares no linguistic relation to the Indo-European 
romantic language family of the surrounding areas, but instead belongs to a pre-Indo-
European language family (Woodworth, 2007). Due to its territorial location and 
cultural distinction, then, the Basque Country has long been viewed as an obstacle to 
the state-making processes (Conversi, 1997). 
 
Unlike Catalan political autonomy, which was severely disabled by the Nueva Planta 
in 1716, the Basque Country was largely unaffected by Castilian political hegemony 
until the end of the 19
th
 century when, in 1876, the Castilian monarchy abolished the 
Basque autochthonous administrative and social structures, known as the fueros
34
. 
                                                 
33 
Such as Conversi (1997) and Shafir (1995). 
34
 The Basque fuero system was an autochthonous administrative structure of local charters dating back 
to the 7
th
 century and which enabled a functional rural noble class, and thus the traditional social 
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Also during this time, the Basque Country experienced major international investment 
and industrialisation, permitted by the Bourbon monarchy (Conversi, 1997). Foreign 
investment and industry ownership flooded the Basque Country, as investors were 
attracted to the entity’s significant supply of natural ore
35
. As new populations and 
rising industry transformed the Basque Country, most native Basques did not 
materially benefit, particularly in the rural regions. In fact, much of what resulted 
from this major shift in the Basque Country was an increase in immigrants
36
, the 
introduction of an economic system modeled after capitalism and the destruction of 
the Basque fuero structure.  
 
Because external forces did not transform the Basque Country until the late 19
th
 
century, Basque political autonomy movements began much later than their Catalan 
counterparts. Beginning in the 1880s, Basque subnational autonomy efforts started in 
the form of cultural identity establishment
37
. Sabino Arana is the figure who is 
popularly praised as the sole author and predominant activist of formalised Basque 
identity and political thought. Arana has been credited for establishing the earliest 
recorded Basque political ideology, standardising the several dialects of Euskara, 
establishing the Basque Country's first political party, the PNV, among other 
subnational characteristics. Indeed, an understanding of Arana's cultural and political 
ideologies offers significant insight into popular Basque ideology, as Arana's cultural 
and political contributions to Basque identity continue to influence the culturo-
political landscape of the Basque Country.  
 
The history of Basque identity is integral in understanding its exclusive nature. Three 
main factors contribute to its exclusive disposition. As previously mentioned, Basque 
livelihood fundamentally changed as a result of external economic interference
38
. 
External interference from central Spain resulted in a swell in Castilian immigrants. 
                                                                                                                                            
structure, of the Basque Country (Conversi, 1997; Shafir, 1995). 
35
 Natural iron ore is an essential ingredient in the production of steel. The late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries witnessed a considerable demand of steel for the arms and shipping industries (Conversi, 
1997).  
36 
At this time in history, 'immigrants' mainly arrived from central (Castilian) Spain.  
37
 Historically, Basque autochthonous cultural was very diverse. For example, Euskara existed in  
several divergent spellings (Conversi, 1997).  
38
 External economic interference within the Basque Country came, largely, from central Spain. With  
the establishment of prominent Spanish industrial firms, the autochthonous Basque economic and  
social framework became fractured.    
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Furthermore, the Spanish state implemented a deliberate de-institutionalisation 
programme of the fueros. As the late 19
th
 century Basque Country witnessed  
immigrants arriving in droves, mainly to work in proletariat-style mining positions, 
they brought with them Castilian culture and language. As Euskara was so different 
from the Spanish language, few immigrants took up the autochthonous language. 
Moreover, a mass exodus to the Basque urban centres took place, which resulted in 
overcrowded and polluted conditions in several areas throughout the Basque Country. 
All of these events resulted in the loss of traditional Basque culture, an abolition of 
the autochthonous institutional structure and a Castilian language assimilation of the 
Basques. These events were perceived by newly-formed Basque subnationalists as 
examples of the Spanish state implementing an eradication of Basque identity, and 
subsequently subnational political autonomy
39
.    
 
One of Arana’s significant contributions to Basque subnationalist identity was his 
classification of the Basque people. In his writings, Arana described the Basque 
people as ethnically
40
 distinct from, and superior to, all other Spaniards, including 
those from other historical entities
41
 (Shafir, 1995). Indeed, Arana believed that for 
someone to identify as Basque, they must have a minimum amount of direct 
descendants of Basque ancestry. Arana viewed the rapid industrialisation of the 
Basque Country, and the subsequent wave of immigration, as the root cause of the 
loss of traditional Basque identity (Conversi, 1997). Hence, as Euskara had proven to 
be a weak point for Basque subnational identity
42
, Arana used the marker of ethnic 
purity as “... a defensive barrier to prevent the corruption of Basque values and culture 
from external encroachment” (Conversi, 1997, p. 61)
43
. Indeed, it is this exclusive 
style of subnational identity, based upon ethnocentric and anti-modernist values which 
cause authors such as Barber (1992) to dismiss subnational entities as archaic and 
                                                 
39 
Indeed, Basque subnationalists perceived the economic, political and social events of the 19
th
 century 
as an occupation of the Basque Country by the state of Spain (Conversi, 1997). 
40 
It has been difficult for Basque subnationalists to define the characteristics of an 'ethnic' Basque. In 
the mid-19
th
 century, racial-markers were utilised, as was popular at the time of emerging pseudo-
science. Basque identity continued to be on a 'racialised' basis until the atrocities of World War II when 
the use 'race' as separating certain groups of people became politically unacceptable. At this time, the 
ethics behind 'racial' markers came into question and its popularity fell (Conversi, 1997). More recently 
Basque ethnicity has been identified along Basque family names. 
41
  Such as the Catalans and the Galicians. 
42
 Current Euskara usage remains at around 30% (Gobierno Vasco, 2010). 
43
 Indeed, Arana was fully against the cultural assimilation of immigrants in the Basque Country, as 
Arana believed a dilution of Basque identity would result.  
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illiberal.   
 
Historical perceptions and subnationalist identity-creation largely mark the formation 
of Basque cultural and political identity. Indeed, Arana's pivotal position as the first 
Basque subnationalist has had a major impact on the Basque people and his particular 
belief-system created a significantly exclusive subnational identity for the Basque 
Country. This exclusive identity continued throughout the 20
th
 century, increasing in 
intensity throughout the dictatorships of General Primo de Rivera and General 
Franco
44
. As the recent democratisation of Spain has resulted in the most political 
autonomy the Basque Country has seen for over a century, the exclusive legacy of 






An asymmetric state structure  
 
Following the death of General Franco in 1975, the responsibilities of the state were 
undertaken by King Juan Carlos and the task of drafting a new constitution was 
quickly carried out. However, the writing of the Spanish Constitution was by no 
means a straightforward endeavor as a major concern existed in how to address 
Spain’s subnational autonomy complexities (Brighty, 1999). While many regions 
throughout Spain were culturally and politically aligned with Madrid, long-standing 
political sentiments within Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia persisted, and 
divergent degrees of sovereignty were desired.  
 
As a result of the drafting of the Spanish Constitution, an asymmetric-decentralised 
political system was proposed, whereby seventeen regions within Spain were deemed 
‘autonomous communities’ (Roller, 2004). Moreover, as a solution to the historico-
political issues of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, these autonomous 
communities were granted ‘historic nationality’ status which, in effect, allotted these 
                                                 
44
 General Miguel Primo de Rivera ruled Spain from 1923-1930, General Francisco Franco's 
dictatorship ruled from 1939-1975.  
45
 Particularly, seen by the continued existence of extreme subnationalist political parties, such as 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). 
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entities increased political autonomy (Brighty, 1999)
46
. Colino (2009) explains that 
the logic behind Spain’s reformed political structure was the creation of subnational 
autonomy, protected within a constitutional space, so that subnational entities could 
exist in more stable realities which would, in turn, ensure the central state could better 
manage subnational. Thus, all seventeen autonomous communities were granted a 
degree of autonomous political administration, with significant socio-economic and 
cultural autonomy reserved for the historic communities (Edwards, 1999). 
 
Of considerable importance within the Spanish Constitution is its preliminary 
declaration: 
 
The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees 
the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is 
composed and the solidarity among them all (Spanish Senate, 1978, p. 3). 
 
It is clear from the Constitution's preamble that while the Spanish state cedes 
significant autonomy to the historic nationalities, all of Spain is to be fully understood 
as a unified nation. This declaration can be interpreted as a political message to 
subnationalists: we might recognise your autonomy, but we maintain absolute 
sovereignty. 
 
An examination of particular policy areas gives great insight for gauging various 
status levels between the different political levels. For example, under the Spanish 
Constitution, only the state (the national level) is responsible for the policy areas of 
“defense, armed forces, international relations, immigration, monetary system and the 
administration of justice” (Edward, 1999, p. 671). These competencies may be 
deemed high-status in policy scope, as these policies are aligned with the highest level 
of political structure; the determinants of state sovereignty. As determinants of state 
sovereignty include issues of territory, legitimate force and sovereign authority, the 
competency areas of the state may be reflected in those sovereignty determinants.  
 
There are also competencies shared between the state and the subnational entities, 
including labour law, social security, culture and education (Edwards, 1999). These 
                                                 
46
 This pseudo-federal political structure strategy was given the slogan cafe para todos, coffee for 
everyone, wherein each autonomous community was offered varying degrees of political autonomy to 
keep them satisfied (Brighty, 1999).  
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policy areas may be considered competencies in which both the national and the 
subnational levels have an invested interest, but which lack the key determinants of 
state sovereignty, thus allowing the subnational level to gain a degree of policy self-
determination. 
 
Finally, there are policy areas under direct subnational control. These policy areas 
include cultural heritage, tourism, social services and research (Edwards, 1999). 
Moreover, the historic communities such as Catalonia and the Basque Country have 
greater autonomy in these policy areas, compared with the autonomous communities. 
Policy areas under significant control by the historic communities include areas of 
civil law and language, for example. Furthermore, the Basque Country is the only 
subnational entity within Spain to hold substantial fiscal responsibilities, including tax 
management (Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, 1979).  
 
The amount of competencies granted to the subnational level, then, is related to the 
degree of devolution of the state. The Spanish political structure is particular as it 
aims to satisfy the political autonomy demands of the subnational entities. The 
formation of this asymmetric political structure was created with the intention of 
striking a balance between the sovereign responsibilities of the state and the political 
autonomy demands of the subnational entities. These subnational entities, especially 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, led the way for such political devolution to be 
granted. However, the political demands of Catalonia and the Basque Country have 
matured, largely in response to the evolving phenomena in the international sphere. In 
the next chapter, the thesis will engage in an area of international significance, by 
illustrating Catalonia and the Basque Country's experience of foreign immigration and 
exploring the current political competencies of these subnational entities concerning 











Chapter 3 – Foreign Immigrants Meet Subnational Entities 
 
 
While there is a plethora of academic literature on international immigration 
movements and a significant amount of scholarship on subnational identities and 
political autonomy campaigns, little is written of the intersection of the two topics. 
This deficiency is curious as international migration trends are certainly entering 
subnational territories and, thus, affecting subnational socio-political landscapes. This 
chapter explores the foreign immigration patterns in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, noting both historical and current immigration trends. Moreover, the 
perceptions of foreign immigrants in relation to subnational identity are discussed. 
This chapter goes on to examine the current subnational political competencies of 
immigration and explores the issue of why the competency of foreign immigration 
may be significant to Catalonia and the Basque Country. By analysing the patterns of 
foreign immigration affecting Catalonia and the Basque Country, an argument will be 
made that greater subnational political autonomy in the policy area of foreign 
immigration is necessary for the subnational entities of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country to maintain their subnational identities. 
 
 
Immigration background of Catalonia and the Basque Country 
 
Immigration trends in Catalonia and the Basque Country have occurred in different 
patterns and integration has, historically, been addressed in divergent approaches. An 
overview of historical immigration in Catalonia and the Basque Country will help to 
inform the manner in which immigrants have historically been perceived and the 
mode by which immigrants have been integrated into the respective subnations. In the 
following chapter, attention will be placed on current integration policies of Catalonia 
and the Basque Country and how the subnational identities have informed these 
integration policies.  
 
Catalonia has experienced immigration trends for many centuries. Due to the strength 






centuries witnessed constant growth in the Catalan economy. As the available Catalan 
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workforce became fully utilised early on and, thus, immigrants were needed to 
maintain the rising industrial output (Conversi, 1997). Immigrants to Catalonia largely 
came from Spain's poorer regions, such as Andalusia and Murcia, although immigrant 
populations also came from southern France (Conversi, 1997). Indeed in the early 
trends of immigration, Catalonia offered a life of economic prosperity and consisted 
of a culture which was not too dissimilar from immigrants’ native cultures. Conversi 
(1997) asserts that for immigrants, moving to Catalonia was perceived as a positive 
experience, as learning Catalan was relatively simple and immigrants were 
encouraged to engage in the wide variety of Catalan cultural activities
47
. Furthermore, 
through the expectation of Catalan language acquisition, the social integration of 
immigrants was able to occur relatively quickly. Although the main source of Catalan 
subnationalist threat came from the Spanish state and its Castilianisation efforts, 
immigrants were never a popular target of racism or perceived as a threat to Catalan 
identity (Conversi, 1997). While most immigrants arrived in Catalonia speaking 
Spanish, they rapidly assimilated into Catalan life. 
 
Trends in immigration changed significantly by the mid-1970s, turning more 
international in nature. This shift may be attributed to democratisation of Spain and 
the international trends affecting Spain. While the background has changed 
significantly, immigrant integration has remained relatively stable. Indeed, Catalonia 
remains a region of strong economic activity, with foreign immigrants attracted to 
Catalonia's tourism, domestic, construction and agricultural sectors (Cornelius, 2004). 
As of 2009, Catalonia is reported to have a general population 7.5 million. Of the 
general population, nearly 16% are documented as having been born in a foreign 
country (Idescat, 2010). The country of origin for the largest group of foreign 
immigrants is Morocco, with the second largest foreign immigrant group arriving 
from Romania and the third largest group originating from Ecuador
48
 (Idescat, 2010).  
  
Throughout its history, Catalonia has been referred to as the terra de pas (the land of 
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Catalan cultural activities may include festivals, hiking, choral groups, etc.  
48
 Catalonia is reported to have 230,262 legal residents from Morocco, 87,000 legal residents from 
Romania and 84,170 legal residents from Ecuador, respectively (Idescat, 2010). Moroccans are so 
prevalent in Spain because of the close proximity of the two countries, Romanians have only recently 
come into Spain and their high immigrant rates are due to Romania’s recent entrance into the EU. 
Finally, Ecuadorans are prevalent in Spain because of the poor economic situation in Ecuador and the 
socio-cultural relation of Spanish life.  
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passage), welcoming immigrants into both its economic and social spheres (Conversi, 
1997). The combination of its long migrant-receiving history and its robust 
subnational identity, prominent Catalan figures
49
 have popularly insisted that if one 
works in Catalonia and speaks Catalan, one is a Catalan (Cardús i Ros, 2005; 
Conversi, 1997; Kymlicka, 2001; Shafir, 1995). The emphasis on identity in 
Catalonia, then, has traditionally been placed on language acquisition and civic 
engagement. Even after centuries of central state efforts to eradicate Catalan identity, 
with particular efforts leveled at the Catalan language, the Catalan language continued 
to be used as the primary spoken language throughout Catalonia. This unceasing 
persistence of the Catalan language has created a new identity for Catalonia; a certain 
confidence that the autochthonous identity will remain the dominant identity within 
the Catalan territory, resulting in a lack of threat from the foreign immigrant 
populations (Conversi, 1997).  
 
Just as the Basque subnational autonomy campaign developed many years after the 
formation of the Catalan subnational autonomy project, significant immigration to the 
Basque Country also arrived much later. Immigrants first arrived en masse to the 
Basque Country in the 1880s, when the region was opened up to large-scale ore 
mining and steel production (Conversi, 1997). During this period, immigrants (mainly 
young men in search of full-time employment) came from Castilian-dominated 
territories within Spain. As Euskara was a distinct language to Spanish and because 
its use amongst Basques was already waning, few immigrants bothered to acquire the 
language as, unlike in Catalonia, it was an unnecessary factor in gaining employment.  
 
Moreover, as integration within Basque society was popularly formed along 'ethnic' 
lines, immigrants were not able to access Basque identity, and thus were not able to 
fully integrate as Basques. Basque identity was heavily guarded, with few, in any, 
exceptions for a non-Basque person to be considered a Basque or participate in the 
Basque subnational autonomy efforts. A social tension between native Basques and 
immigrants then emerged. Barriers to integration, caused by the guarded Basque 
identity, made it so that immigrants were unable to access Basque identity, such as 
language and participation in Basque cultural events, leading to a further 
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 For example, Francisc Candel Tortajada and Jordi Pujol. 
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Castilianisation of the Basque Country. This cyclical process of a protectionist Basque 
identity, leading to the alienation of immigrant populations, resulting in the non-
integration or uptake of Basque culture by immigrants led to the weakening of a 
Basque identity.  As compared to Catalonia, then, the Basque Country has historically 
been defensive of its subnational cultural identity in relation to immigrants (Shafir, 
1995). This defensive nature of Basque identity, related to the historical experience of 
Castilian influence and the popular subnational ideology of Sabino Arana, has 
continued to disadvantage the Basque Country in its foreign immigrant integration 




 immigration has been a major phenomenon within the Basque 
Country, foreign immigration has not been as substantial. As of 2006, the general 
population of the Basque Country was 2,129,339. Of the general population, 
approximately 4.5% were foreign-born
51
. Although foreign immigrants do not 
constitute a major demographic within the Basque Country, general immigration 
(including internal immigration) has had significant influence on the Basque Country 
and has been partly attributed to the loss of traditional Basque culture and 
autonomous institutions (Conversi, 1997). 
 
 
Subnational immigration competencies 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, neither the autonomous communities of Spain nor the 
historic nationalities retain immigration policy competencies. Due, largely, to the 
Westphalian principle of the sovereign state maintaining national territories, the 
Spanish state continues to hold sole authority of immigration policy. The reserved 
right of the state concerning immigration policy can be found in Article 49.2 in the 
Spanish Constitution which states that areas of citizenship law, immigration and 
emigration and general foreigner status are invested only at the national level (Davis, 
2009; Roller, 2004).  
 
                                                 
50
 Internal immigration may be understood as migration deriving from greater Spain. Internal 
immigrants largely identified with Castilian culture.  
51 
Of the 96,000 foreign immigrants in the Basque Country, 23,423 are immigrants from the EU and 




, however, are able to travel freely throughout Spain, moving from one 
autonomous community to the next. This freedom of movement includes foreign 
immigrants, moving throughout the entirety of Spain. Given the particularities of 
formal and informal labour markets, migrants have tended to live and work in specific 
autonomous communities, with Catalonia attracting the most foreign immigrants
53
. 
While Catalonia receives the highest level of foreign immigrants in comparison to 
other Spanish autonomous communities, the Spanish state retains all foreign policy 
and immigration policy competencies, leaving Catalonia with no authority to create its 
own foreign policy or immigration policy. Therefore, while Catalonia experiences the 
largest trends of foreign immigrant populations, it does not enjoy the political 
authority to create or influence the international trends affecting its territory at a 
greater degree than the other autonomous communities within Spain. Some authors, 
such as Guidauron & Lahav (2000), identify this contradiction as a source of further 
political autonomy aspiration by subnational entities.  
 
Although the subnational entities of Spain lack the responsibility of immigration 
competencies, under the Spanish Constitution these entities have the authority to 
create and fulfill integration competencies. Some subnational entities, such as 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, have taken hold of this competency and have 
developed robust integration policies. In the next chapter, the thesis argues that 
Catalonia and the Basque Country have devoted extensive efforts in the creation and 
promotion of their respective integration policies which the thesis regards as a 
strategy for these subnational entities to exert some level of sovereignty over a foreign 
demographic which has the potential to limit subnational identity and political 
autonomy campaigns. This thesis argues that the significant undertaking of integration 
policy is not simply used by subnational entities who receive disproportionately high 
rates of immigrants, but as a tactical strategy whereby the subnations of Catalonia and 
the Basque Country exert a degree of political autonomy which they use to promote 
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 Subject to legal immigration status, of course. 
53
 Catalonia attracts many foreign immigrants due to its large construction, agriculture and domestic 
labour markets. Furthermore, these fields of work constitute the bulk of the Catalan informal labour  
sector.  
54
 Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy campaigns may also be found in the wider international  
context, such as the EU. Chapter 4 will explore this international campaign strategy. 
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There is a high degree of academic attention paid to the transition of identity from 
receiving societies to foreign populations within the national context. Indeed, Favell 
(2009) states that “nearly every European nation-state has formulated in recent years a 
policy on 'integration' of immigrants that reflects mainly nation-building concerns 
about imparting national culture and values to newcomers...” (p. 175). This line of 
logic, then, may be extended to the subnational entities, whereby the dissemination of 
autochthonous identities is even more crucial, as the cultural cohesion of subnational 
populations is pivotal in maintaining the existence and advancement of subnational 
autonomy campaigns (Kymlicka, 2001). The next chapter continues this examination 
of integration policies and begins by applying Durkheim’s theory of the ‘national 
ideal’ to the integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country. By 
demonstrating how Catalonia and the Basque Country use integration policies to 
promote their respective subnational identities, this thesis purports that the promotion 
of subnational identities assists in the maintenance and advancement of the respective 





















Chapter 4 - Empirical Framework 
 
 
This chapter is divided into two contemporary theories, Durkheim's 'national ideal' 
theory and Baumgartner and Jones's 'venue shopping' theory. The aim of using these 
two theories is to examine the themes of Catalonia and the Basque Country’s 
integration policies and the extent of informal political competency activities in which 
Catalonia and the Basque Country are involved. Firstly, Durkheim's 'national ideal' 
theory is discussed and this theory is applied to two sets of integration policy, 
Catalonia's Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2005-2008
55
 and the Basque Country's 
Immigration Plan 2006-2009. The second section of this chapter illustrates 
Baumgartner and Jones's 'venue shopping' theory and applies this theories to 
examples of informal policy relationships in which Catalonia and the Basque Country 
are involved. Some of these relationships are deemed horizontal; a term used for 
relationships at the same political level, namely subnational-subnational. Other 
relationships are deemed vertical; a term used to classify relationships at different 
political levels, namely subnational-supranational
56
. These two sections aim, then, to 
demonstrate how Catalonia and the Basque Country sustain their subnational 
identities while at the same time, expand their informal competencies in order to 
advance their subnational political autonomy campaigns.   
 
 




 theory of the 'national ideal' is utilised to analyse the integration 
theories of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Durkheim asserted that for a nation to 
become its ideal interpretation, a society must actively work to enhance its 
institutional structure and moral merit (Guibernau, 2006). The concept of a 'national 
ideal' evolved from Durkheim's notion of the 'human ideal', which purports that an 
individual strives throughout its life to become the optimum version of herself or 
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 The term 'citizenship' and/or 'immigration plan' is a rough translation for 'integration plan’. When 
'immigration' plans of Catalonia and the Basque Country are referred to, they are to be understood as 
'integration' plans.    
56 
Of course, subnational-national relations also exist in venue-shopping examples. However, the focus 
of vertical relations in this thesis will concentrate on subnational-supranational political relations.  
57
 Emile Durkheim, French sociologist (1858-1917). 
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himself, in both abilities and virtues (Guibernau, 2006). Durkheim purported that 
when individuals were able to realise their ideal incarnation, this phenomenon would 
be reflected in the society at large, whereby the greater society would, too, become a 
more capable version of itself. Durkheim suggested that instead of societies basing 
their prestige on wealth or territorial girth, societies would instead base their 
eminence on civil liberties, human rights, institutional efficiency and political 
pluralism (Guibernau, 2006).  
 
Durkheim, then, deduced a reciprocal nature between the 'human' and 'nation' levels. 
For example, when individuals take up the duty of personal improvement, the 
respective society will be better off, as it will be populated by individuals actively 
working to better themselves. Likewise, when a society advances its democratic 
orientation and practices, such as by improving its policy effectiveness and political 
institutions, there is likely to be a positive influence on the individuals of that society. 
Therefore, a cyclical process exists whereby individuals and societies have the ability 
to influence one another. By understanding this relationship, an active pursuit in the 
improvement of both individuals and society can be implemented.  
 
Durkheim's 'national ideal' theory will be transmutated into the 'subnational ideal' for 
the purpose of this thesis, to draw parallel to the subnational cases of Catalonia and 
the Basque Country. This thesis assesses the aims of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country by their historic calls for political autonomy, the subnational identities 
promoted within each subnation’s integration policy and the subnational political 
agendas of Catalonia and the Basque Country apparent at supranational forums. This 
thesis purports that the aim of subnational entities pursuing political agendas which 
are embedded with ‘subnational ideal’ themes is for the supranational level to take 
notice in the high standard of subnational policy aims. Furthermore, this thesis argues 
that the aim of the supranational level to recognise the high standard of subnational 
policy aims is for subnational entities to achieve enhanced political recognition, 




Similar to Durkheim’s ‘national ideal’ theory is the literature of Folch-Serra and 
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 And supranational institutions’ subsequent pressure on national entities to more fully recognise and 
grant political autonomy to subnational entities. 
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Nogue-Font (2004), who explain that when a state has the ability to influence societal 
determinants, civil society may transform its respective society to more fully embrace 
social justice and democratic values.  The notion of transforming a society into a 
superior version of itself relates to many rationales behind subnational political 
autonomy campaigns. As the legitimate actors in the international political system are 
states, subnational entities are regarded as inferior political units when compared to 
states, and therefore are not granted significant political recognition or sovereignty. 
Therefore, to gain positive attention at the international level, many subnational 
entities have made use of their less recognized political position by developing or 
enhancing highly regarded political values in the subnational discourse. For example, 
Conversi (1997), Giordano & Roller (2002), Keating (2001) and Laitan (1997) have 
found that Catalonia ascribes to a supposed 'European identity' which, they argue, 
promotes the implication of highly acclaimed political values such as having 
advanced democratic institutions, a high level of social inclusion and valuing 
individual liberties. The logic follows that by creating and promoting a politically and 
socially sophisticated society, the likelihood of being better recognised in the 
international political system will be enhanced.  
 
The concept of cosmopolitanism has also been cited as offering an advanced socio-
political identity, guided by political altruism, which has been employed by a range of 
political entities (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Guibernau, 2006). By moulding a 
society to embody the highest level of democratic values, it is surmised that national 
and supranational political entities will take note of the subnation's advanced socio-
political values, disregard the archaic stereotype of subnational entities and reward the 
subnational entities with increased recognition and participation at the international 
political level. Guibernau (2006) states that by utilising the 'subnational ideal' as a 
political strategy, subnational entities, like Catalonia and the Basque Country, will be 
able to create a more cohesive and compelling subnational political autonomy 
campaign.   
  
Of course, the 'subnational ideal' as a political strategy may be easier for some 
subnational entities to engage than others. For example, it could be posited that a 
society which is already entrenched with democratic values could more readily refine 
those values than a society which has not been entrenched with democratic values. 
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McGarry, Keating & Moore (2006) assert that, among other subnational entities, 
Catalonia and the Basque Country are in a particularly adept position of refining their 
democratic standards as both subnational entities are deep-rooted in democratic 
values
59
. Creating advanced socio-political societies, then, may be deemed an 
achievable task for Catalonia and the Basque Country.  
 
This thesis posits that by utilising the 'subnational ideal' theory, the political function 
of Catalonia and the Basque Country’s integration policies may be more fully 
realised. In particular, the 'subnational ideal' theory acts as an analytical framework by 
which to examine the socio-political subtexts guiding Catalonia and the Basque 
Country’s integration policies. While the ‘subnational ideal’ theory has not been 
isolated nor affirmed by either Catalonia or the Basque Country, this thesis asserts that 
the socio-political subtexts of Catalan and Basque integration policies may be 
embedded in the logic of the ‘subnational ideal’, which, in turn, aims to promote 
Catalan and Basque political autonomy campaigns as modern and legitimate in merit.   
 
 
Integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country 
 
In the European context, integration policy creation has been on the rise, particularly 
since the 1970s, when immigrants were realised by states as permanent in nature. 
Beginning in the 1980s, many states which were traditionally states of 'emigration' 
became states of 'immigration'
60
. As immigrants came to be perceived as permanent 
populations within receiving states, integration policies were conceived to further the 
social integration of these foreign populations. Integration policies have long been 
employed as a way of transmitting autochthonous social values to immigrant 
populations (Favell, 2009). While integration policy construction has been, and 
remains, popular at the national level, subnational entities have increasing produced 
integration policies of their own. Compared to national integration policies, however, 
subnational integration policies are of particular importance for subnational entities, 
as subnational entities have limited, if any, authority of immigration policy and, 
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hence, largely depend upon the socio-cultural integration of foreign immigrants as a 
way of maintaining and promoting subnational identity and political understandings. 
 
The reserved right of the Spanish state concerning immigration policy can be found in 
Article 49.2 in the Spanish Constitution, which proclaims the areas of citizenship law, 
immigration and emigration and general foreigner status as under the sole 
responsibility of the state (Davis, 2009). A distinct division, then, is apparent in the 
policy competencies undertaken by the state and the policy competencies granted to 
the subnational entities. Although under the Spanish Constitution the autonomous 
communities do not possess the political sovereignty to engage in foreign policy or 
immigration policy for example, a generally substantial level of political autonomy is 
devolved to the subnational level
61
.  One such area of political autonomy controlled 
that by the autonomous communities is integration policy. Catalonia and the Basque 
Country have both produced multiple integration policies, and within them, have 
tailored unique themes of how integration is best approached in their respective 
societies.  
 
This thesis asserts that the creation of Catalan and Basque integration policies have 
been created for two main purposes. Firstly, integration policies represent a method 
whereby Catalonia and the Basque Country can exert self-determination over the 
socio-political values which outline how immigrants should integrate into their 
respective societies. Secondly, integration policies are used as informal competency 
avenues whereby Catalonia and the Basque Country promote their subnational 
political autonomy campaigns by utilising socio-political themes within their 
respective integration policies which are in line with the 'subnational ideal' theory. 
Therefore, the thesis posits that specific political values are purposely embedded in 
Catalan and Basque integration policies, with the dual aim of enhancing social 
cohesion within their societies and gaining supranational recognition for their high 
quality values embedded in their integration policies.  
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 Largely as a result of the legacy of the Franco regime, the Spanish state has a notable level of 
political devolution, with many authors labeling Spain as a quasi-federal state (Roller, 2002). In 
addition to the level of devolution allotted to the autonomous communities, higher levels of sovereignty 
have been granted to the historic communities of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, which 
were disproportionately afflicted during Franco's reign.  
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The following section consists of the first component of the analytical framework of 
Catalonia and the Basque Country’s construction of subnational integration policies as 
a strategy for gaining increased political autonomy. In this section, discourse analyses 
of the current Catalan and Basque integration policies are presented. These analyses 
will be utilised to explore the political themes promoted within these integration 
policies. The aim of this section, then, is to uncover the political themes of the Catalan 
and Basque integration policies and connect them with the ‘subnational ideal’ theory.  
 
 
A comparative analysis of the integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country 
 
While Catalonia and the Basque Country have differing historic-political contexts, 
‘subnational ideal' discourses can be found in the integration policies of each 
subnational entity
62
. Throughout Catalonia's Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2005-
2008, historical references to the legacy of Catalonia's inclusive reception of 
immigrant populations are noted. For example, the Generalitat (2006) states that the 
integration policy has “an optimistic focus, motivated by a tradition of receiving 
immigrants, whose perceptions of current immigration is as a new opportunity to 
unite Catalan society with a view to the future” (p. 158). In this statement, the 
Generalitat makes clear that Catalonia has long been highly competent in the 
integration of immigrants and this new integration policy aims to maintain that level 
of competence so as to produce a cohesive Catalan society for the future. Thus, in line 
with the 'subnational ideal' theory’s aim of self-improvement, the Catalan integration 
policy aims to continue the integration efforts that have so far worked for their society 
so as to further perpetuate the refinement of Catalan social sphere.  
 
Conversely, the Basque Country's Immigration Plan 2006-2009 asserts its 
'subnational ideal' aim with a complete rejection of its historical legacy of social 
exclusivity. Indeed, traditional Basque values of ethnic exclusivity and cultural 
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nobility are rejected as these values resulted in a negative perception of immigrants 
which has, thus far, inhibited the integration of foreign immigrants into Basque 
society (Gobierno Vasco, 2001). Instead, the Basque integration policy aims to declare 
its new approach with the integration of foreign immigrants and promotes a policy 
characterised by an inclusive approach to the economic, political and social reception 
of immigrants (Gobierno Vasco, 2001). Furthermore, the principle of 'reciprocal 
integration' is promoted, whereby “... both the Basque people and the immigrants 
participate fully in the economic, political and social Basque life ...” (Gobierno Vasco, 
2001, p. 10).       
 
A 'subnational ideal' theme can also be found in both the Catalan and Basque 
integration policies, which asserts a strong bond with the subnational entities and the 
EU. In the Catalan integration policy, the Generalitat (2006) attributes EU values of 
democratic political rights and social justice as being the inspiration behind several 
themes of its policy. Likewise, the Gobierno Vasco (2001) attributes its new approach 
to immigrant integration as akin to the notion of European citizenship, characterised 
by inclusion and human rights.  
 
The further theme which is apparent in both Catalan and Basque integration policies 
is the way in which subnational values are extended to foreign immigrant populations. 
Within the Catalan integration policy, Catalan language acquisition and civic 
engagement are pronounced as the tools by which foreign immigrants can more fully 
integrate into Catalan society (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006). For example, the 
Catalan integration policy states that the likelihood of integration is associated to the 
acquisition of the Catalan language (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006) Historically, 
methods of linguistic uptake and civic engagement have been well utilised by 
immigrants to Catalonia, with the objective of more thoroughly engaging in the 
economic, political and social spheres of Catalan society and, as a result, more fully 
integrating into Catalan society. It is not surprising that language acquisition is 
classified as a method of foreign immigrant integration, as within the Catalan context, 
linguistic rights and the regular use of Catalan is highly regarded as apart of Catalan 
culturo-political identity (Conversi, 1997)
63
. Moreover, the Catalan integration policy 
                                                 
63
 One example of encouraging subnational socio-political identities is the free Catalan language  
 34
states that “the residents of Catalonia, whatever their origin, have to be able to 
communicate among themselves and with the public authorities in Catalan” 
(Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006, p. 160). Furthermore, the Catalan integration policy 
identifies values such as civic participation as integral to Catalan political identity and 
explains that by engaging in civil society, foreign immigrants will be better able to 
partake in Catalan political identity and, thus, fully integrate into Catalan society 
(Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006).  
 
As opposed to Catalan social and political values, the Basque integration policy works 
to distance itself from the traditional Basque conceptions of identity which have 
marred the social and political integration of immigrants in the Basque Country. 
However, one authentically Basque identity value that the Basque integration policy 
maintains is its understanding the destructive influence which liberal economics can 
have on traditional cultures. For example, within the Basque integration policy,  the 
Gobierno Vasco (2001) states that the unjust underdevelopment of the global South 
has caused traditional societies to become strained, with huge gaps in prosperity 
leading some of the desperate to emigrate from their homeland. Indeed, the Basque 
integration policy attributes a significant factor behind international migration to, 
largely, uneven patterns of economic capital (Gobierno Vasco, 2001). This socio-
economic phenomenon is very close to the heart of the Basque experience, as the 
introduction of the capitalist economic structure in the late 19
th
 century resulted in a 
break-down in traditional Basque institutional structures, mass internal migration to 
the urban centres and a generalised loss of traditional Basque culture. While the 
detailing of a global socio-economic reality does not assist in the integration of 
foreign immigrants in the Basque Country per se, the linking of the two contexts 
offers an empathetic understanding of the international migration situation.  
 
The final theme which may be analysed in both the Catalan and Basque integration 
policies is the demand for increased subnational political autonomy. Throughout the 
Catalan integration policy the Generalitat de Catalunya (2006) claims that as 
Catalonia does not have sovereignty over its borders, it is not able to control the 
trends of foreign immigration arriving to its territory. This predicament has, as its 
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the Generalitat. 
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integration policy states, caused the Catalan government to feel trapped by a 
globalised situation over which it has little political control. For example, a cynical 
tone can be interpreted from the Generalitat de Catalunya's statement that Catalonia 
has experienced “... years of foreign communities arriving without the society that 
was receiving them being able to manage either their arrival or the effect they had” 
(2006, p. 157). Thus, this statement declares the Catalan government’s dissatisfaction 
with its low level of political autonomy and, in effect, the lack of authority of the 
management of the highest levels of immigration within Spain. Thus, the 
contradiction earlier described in this chapter, between the rate of foreign immigration 
to Catalonia and the lack of authority to manage its foreign immigration flows, is 
acknowledged in the Catalan integration plan.  
 
Finally, the Basque integration policy places symbolic demands on its political 
autonomy. While the Basque Country is not a politically sovereign entity, the apparent 
point of contention within the Basque integration policy lies in the political barrier 
inhibiting many foreign immigrants to fully integrate within Basque society. The issue 
is illustrated in the state’s sole authority of citizenship competencies. The Gobierno 
Vasco (2001) asserts that de facto residents within the Basque Country should be 
entitled full political rights and that the conventional pathway of Spanish citizenship 
is too exclusive and contributes to gaps in the integration of foreign immigrants. Thus, 
the illegal status of 'irregular immigrants' inhibits foreign immigrants’ integration into 
Basque society. A more inclusive citizenship utilised by the Spanish state would allow 
for deeper democratic capabilities of foreign immigrants, including increased political 
and social participation (Gobierno Vasco, 2001). Therefore, the Basque integration 
plan seeks a change to the competencies under the Basque Statute of Autonomy 
whereby the issuing of citizenship becomes an area of authority for the Basque 
government.  While it is confusing whether the Basque integration policy purports the 
right to have an autonomous immigration system enabling all illegal immigrants to be 
granted legal immigration status, or simply the right to enable already legal residents 
in the Basque Country to attain citizenship, one point is clear; the Basque integration 
policy promotes the concept that the Basque Country will only be politically 
autonomous when it is granted the right to regulate who enters the Basque Country’s 
territory.  
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From the Basque Country's integration policy this thesis gathers that for the Basque, a 
democratic society is dependent upon the political participation of all people. There is, 
then, an emphasis on a human rights based approach to citizenship and immigrant 
engagement. There is also a linkage to Basque citizenship as European citizenship, 
with the Basque integration plan attempting to distance itself away from its historical, 
race-based identity and promote a non-essentialist Basque identity. Furthermore, 
unlike the Catalan case, the Basque integration plan emphasises a human rights-based 
approach as the basis for integrating foreign immigrants
64
. This is in comparison to 
the Catalan integration plan, which emphasises Catalan language acquisition and the 
principle of pluralism. Both policies, however, stress the need for changes to 
citizenship avenues in order to make the political and social inclusion of foreign 
immigrants within the respective subnational entities more possible.  
 
While the Catalan integration policy utilises themes of its historic legacy of 
integrating immigrants with emphasis on language acquisition and civic engagement, 
the Basque integration plan is found to be a novel conception of immigrant integration 
for the Basque Country. Thus, the Basque integration policy is found in significant 
contrast to its former defensive, ethnic-based identity. The purpose behind this shift, I 
will argue, is the aspiration of the Basque Country’s subnational political autonomy 
campaign to be regarded positively and for its subnationalist campaign to warrant 
enhanced political opportunities at the international level. While the Catalan and 
Basque integration plans differ in theme, usage of a ‘subnational ideal’ theme is 
apparent in both plans with the aim of enhanced political autonomy.  
 
 
‘Venue Shopping’ theory 
 
As subnational entities within Spain have come to realise, formal competency 
expansion tends to be a very stagnant process. Therefore, alternative political 
strategies have been employed by subnational entities in order to garner increased 
levels of political self-determination. The alternative political strategy utilised in this 
section is Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) 'venue shopping' theory. In this section, 
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'venue shopping' theory will be described and examples are illustrated to demonstrate 
how 'venue shopping' practices are utilised by Catalonia and the Basque Country with 
the aim of developing their informal political competencies. This section purports that 
the aim of Catalonia and the Basque Country in enhancing informal competencies is 
to attain increased political autonomy.  
 
Since the ratification of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, Catalonia and the Basque 
Country have relentlessly demanded increased political autonomy. In governing 
terms, enhanced political autonomy may be achieved when subnational entities attain 
increased political competencies (Colino, 2009). However, when the subnational-
national relationship becomes strained as a result of the state denying the demanded 
level of increased authority of the  political competencies of the subnational entities, 
these entities may explore alternative political avenues in  order to achieve increased 
political autonomy. One such alternative political practice comes in the form of 'venue 
shopping theory'. In this section, the 'venue shopping' practices of Catalonia and the 
Basque Country are analysed and an evaluation of the alternative political avenues is 
explored so as to assess whether venue shopping practices have attained increased 
political competencies, and, in effect, heightened political autonomy for Catalonia and 
the Basque Country.  
 
Venue shopping is a term coined by Baumgartner and Jones in 1993. This thesis, 
however, utilises Pralle’s (2003) interpretation of venue shopping, as Pralle (2003) 
applied the concept of venue shopping in his analysis of an independent policy area, 
similar to what is pursued with integration policy in this thesis. Pralle (2003) states 
that venue shopping may be understood as an activity which aims at “… finding a 
decision setting that offers the best prospects for reaching one's policy goals…” (p. 
233). The logic follows that if the political outcomes between two groups have 
become stagnant, the best option for the group that is seeking a change is to 'shop' (i.e. 
explore, engage in dialogue) around alternative 'venues' (e.g. other state governments, 
international organisations).  
 
As earlier discussed, Catalonia and the Basque Country are bound by the Spanish 
Constitution as entities within the state of Spain, whose areas of political authority 
and participation are restricted. Formal competencies, such as defense, citizenship, 
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international relations and immigration are controlled at the national level. Informal 
competencies, such as social services, municipal administration and language have 
been granted authority at the subnational level, the autonomous communities. Starting 
in the 1980s, Catalonia and the Basque Country have formally lobbied for greater 
political autonomy in the form of increased political competencies; however formal 
competencies have remained solely under the authority of the Spanish state.  
 
Rather than limiting political lobbying to the national level, an alternative method for 
subnational entities would be to engage with entities other than the state, such as with 
supranational entities or other subnational entities which have learnt lessons in 
pursuing increased formal competency authority. Venue shopping is common amongst 
entities which have previously been stuck in constitutional or organisational 
arrangements whereby their competency abilities are bound. Such entities have often 
exhausted their primary policy-relations and are frustrated by the time they embark 
upon venue shopping (Nagel, 2004; Pralle, 2003). Venue shopping can be rational and 
planned as well as ad hoc. Pralle (2003) explains the motive behind venue shopping, 
 
“Alternative venues give policymakers and advocacy groups who are on the 
losing side of policy an opportunity to go over the heads of, or around, a 
policy elite intent on maintaining the status quo. If successful, the policy 
conflict moves into a venue where these challengers compete more equally 
with their opponents, or to an arena where their opponents are not yet 
mobilised. Policy change often follows if alternative definitions of a policy 
problem are accepted and promoted in the new venue, policy participation 
expands as a result of venue shifting, and new rules are articulated and 
enforced in the policy arena by new institutional actors” (Pralle, 2003, p. 
236). 
 
Venue shopping can be used for both short-term and long-term goals. In fact, an entity 
may engage in venue shopping activities because they understand that “long-term 
change requires the involvement of a particular institution or level of governance” 
(Pralle, 2003, p. 243). In the situation where a subnational entity is bound by 
constitutional law in its political position, and thus restricted in their political scope, 
this long-term venue shopping strategy may be utilised as a way to influence the 
respective state, or supranational entity which has the scope of influencing the state, 
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resulting in an enhanced level of formal competencies or political recognition. For 
example, Catalonia has established 'cultural embassies' in numerous capital cities 
throughout the world. While Catalonia, under the Spanish Constitution, is not able to 
conduct foreign policy on its own behalf, these 'cultural embassies' have provided 
Catalonia with opportunities of cultural and political dialogue at the international 
level. Of particular interest is Catalonia's office in Brussels, capital of the EU (Downs, 
2003). The presence of Catalan government officials in Brussels is related to the 
aspiration of the Generalitat to have direct participation in EU policy making, and 
whose ultimate goal is to attain equal political representation as the EU member states 
(Govan, 2009; Squires, 1999). Thus, by maintaining a constant presence in Brussels, 
the Generalitat aims to supplement Spain’s position as the sole representative of the 
Spanish territory with the addition of Catalan political representation and 
participation.  
 
Venue shopping strategies are particularly popular within Catalan politics and the 
Catalan public has begun to take note of the influence which alternative political 
relationships can make at the subnational level. As one supporter of a Catalan 
nationalist party (the ERC) states “the [EU] to us represents democracy, human rights 
and a respect for freedom and we hope one day to be recognised as our own state 
within it” (Govan, 2009, p. 1). The Catalan subnationalist supporter goes on to state 
“... the European Union offers protection … if tomorrow Catalonia voted to break 
away from Spain, Madrid couldn't send in the army as it has threatened in the past 
because we are a part of Europe and protected by its laws” (Govan, 2009, p. 1). 
Alternative political relations, then, are increasingly viewed as having the ability of 
creating serious political change for subnations.       
 
A major incentive for subnational entities to participate at the EU level may be found 
in what is termed procedural ability. For decisions to be made, decision-making must 
first take place. However, one could assert that decision-making is not a fully 
democratic process, as there are rules as to who can and cannot participate within the 
decision-making process. Therefore, it is important to note who is allowed, and not 
allowed, to participate in decision-making, and often this depends on the particular 
procedures in place at the institutional level. Kerremans (1996) explains that political 
procedures are a system of power structures, whereby to be apart of policy-making, an 
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entity must be a recognised member of the political institution. Therefore, in able to 
influence the decisions of a political institution, the respective political entity must 
first be recognised in the institution, and second be a valued participant (Kerremans, 
1996). This explanation demonstrates the importance of subnational entities' 
campaigns towards gaining equal political representation as the member states in EU 
institutions to have any significant influence.   
 
References to the EU as a venue of political opportunity for subnational entities rose 
in popularity during the 1990s. Downs (2002) attributes this connection to the 
Maastrict Treaty and its principle of subsidiarity. In the EU context, subsidiarity is the 
“... notion that the EU should govern as close as possible to the citizen...” (Pollack, 
2005, p. 30). Since the enshrinement of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastrict 
Treaty, subnational political leaders have proclaimed the EU’s more intimate 
relationship to the common citizen than the relationship between the member states 
and their citizens.  
 
While the EU has not, as a result, granted equal political representation to the 
subnational entities as the member states, the principle of subsidiarity has acted as an 
allowance for subnational entities to have more presence in Brussels than ever before. 
The political aspiration of the 'nation plus state' approach is apparent in cases where 
subnationalist parties, such as the CiU, call for subnational entities to be granted equal 
status with the member states in the EU Council (Laitin, 2004). The aspiration behind 
this approach is the creation of an even political playing field whereby subnational 
and national entities within the EU have equal representation and participation in EU 
policy-making and agenda-setting. As Catalonia and the Basque Country have yet to 
attain equal political status with the Spanish state within their own autonomous 
communities, the opportunity to achieve this level of political representation at the EU 
level has much allure.  
 
Many subnational leaders have used the principle of subsidiarity to defend their quest 
of gaining political recognition at the European level. Leaders such as Jordi Pujol
65
, 
not only profess their respective subnational entity’s natural 'Europeanness', they also 
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use subsidiarity as the principle by which they campaign, asserting themselves as 
leaders closer to 'the people' than any state leader could ever proclaim (Keating, 2006; 
Keating, 2001; Newhouse, 1997). Indeed, Downs (2002) explains that this political 
tactic “...has provided one of the stimuli for [subnationalism] emboldening 
[subnational] leaders to assert their territorial autonomy, to travel with the attitude and 
air of a head of state, to open quasi-embassies ('informational offices') in multiple 





Vertical relations can be vital assets to the progress and/or outcome of subnational 
political autonomy campaigns. Edwards (1999) states that “the European context has 
also provided [Catalonia] with opportunities to promote relations with other regions 
and to forge cross-border partnerships” (p. 675). While Edwards (1999) acknowledges 
the limited nature of the political outcomes for Catalonia, he maintains the view that 
“Europe has provided the Catalans with opportunities to project themselves onto the 
international stage and to forge another identity…” (p. 675). Newhouse (1997) 
explains that many regional leaders and officials are self-professed Europeans; 
promoting the concept of bypassing national levels and engaging directly with 
Brussels. Again, many subnational leaders have used the principle of subsidiarity to 
defend their political quest at the European level.  
 
Significant political participation within the EU is particularly important for 
subantional entities, as the process of ‘widening’, rather than ‘deepening’ has become 
the pattern of the EU’s development, leading some subnational entities to demand 
more political participation in the EU
67
. The process of 'widening' in the EU is also 
cause of subnational concern and has often fueled discussions concerning the 
subnational entities in the EU. For example, subnational entities are often 
overwhelmed when new, comparatively smaller states are admitted as EU member 
states, while subnational entities such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, which 
have equal or greater populations than some member states, (e.g. Cyprus, Estonia, 
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Latvia, Luxembourg and Malta) continue to be side-lined. While the new member 
states enjoy significant political relations at the EU-level, subnational entities 
continue to lack direct representation within the EU (Keating, 2006).  
 
Political parties within subnational entities have taken note of venue-shopping 
strategies and have responded accordingly. Roller & Sloat (2002) explain that there 
has been an “...increasing emphasis that [sub]nationalist parties in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country have placed on 'Europe'... (p. 73). These historical communities in 
Spain have been the most vocal about their desires for regional representation at the 
EU level (Roller & Sloat, 2002). Roller & Sloat (2002) state that although subnational 
entities have largely been successful in publicising contradictions between their lack 
of formal recognition and their significant economic and socio-political influence 
across Europe. For example, Catalan subnationalist leaders have publicised that EU 
member states such as Denmark and Finland, who have fewer language speakers than 
Catalonia, were allotted official EU language recognition once they became member 
states. On the other hand, Catalonia, which has a population of seven million, 
consistently contributes to a quarter of the Spanish economy and has its own language 
base of over ten million speakers over three states (France, Italy, Spain) does not 
receive such official recognition simply because it does not have state status (Nagel, 
2004; Guibernau, 2006).  
 
For all of its pronouncements of importance, Catalonia has made small steps of 
progress in EU institutions, including in the area of language recognition. For 
example, Catalan was the first subnational language to receive official recognition by 
the EU. Although Catalan is now recognised within the EU as a ‘community’ 
language, and has yet to be deemed an ‘official language’, it is nonetheless significant 
that Catalan has garnered such status (Laitin, 2004). This status attainment, however 
‘unofficial’, is important as it places some amount of socio-political recognition of a 
subnational entity at the supranational level. It can be posited that without intense 
lobbying at the EU, many political feats such as this example would not have been 
realised.  
  
A final notion that subnational entities have exploited in order to attain greater 




 (Guibernau, 2006). De Winter & Cachafeiro (2002) explain that 
subsidiarity and the EU's supposed 'democratic deficit' are related in that as EU 
integration is a centralised process at the EU level, transfers of competencies from the 
national to the supranational level result. This process, then, “…constitutes an 
amplification of the 'democratic deficit' defined in terms of distance between decision-
makers and the beneficiaries of public policies” (De Winter & Cachafeiro, 2002, p. 
489). As a result of this ‘democratic deficit’ reputation, the “… European Commission 
had begun to act in an accessible manner towards sub-national levels of government” 
(Coates, 1998, p. 267) in an effort to appear more attune with principles of 
subsidiarity. For example, the Maastrict Treaty has included subnational 
representatives to be part of decision-making in the EU Council (Coates, 1998).  
 
The next section of this chapter illustrates examples of the venue shopping activities 
of Catalonia and the Basque Country. In particular, the venue shopping activities 
which surround the theme of foreign immigrant integration are analysed. Two 
separate levels of relations by which venue shopping being pursued are explored; 
horizontal relations and vertical relations. Horizontal relations
69
 may be defined as 
relations formed between two like entities, such as between Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and Quebec or the Basque Country and Scotland. In each of these 
pairs, a relation exists between two subnational entities. Examples of horizontal 
relations may be related to activities of venue shopping and/or policy transfer (Davis, 
2009).  
 
The second level of relations, vertical relations, may be defined as relations formed 
between two different-leveled entities, such as Catalonia or the Basque Country and 
Spain or Catalonia or Basque Country and the EU. In the case of Catalonia and the 
Basque Country, these subnational entities have engaged in vertical relations with the 
Spanish state for centuries. The result of these relations has been met with periods of 
the Spanish state repressing Basque and Catalan subnational identities and periods 
when Spain has granted increased political autonomy to these subnational entities. 
However, because political autonomy campaigns are still prominent in Catalonia and 
the Basque Country, one could purport that these subnational entities have not 
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 Horizontal relations are often referred to as ‘paradiplomacy’ in the academic literature (Davis, 2009). 
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achieved the degree of political autonomy to which they aspire. Particularly since the 
Spanish Constitution, when competencies at subnational and national levels were 
outlined in law, subnational relations with the Spanish state have become 
characterised by only incremental progress. Therefore, alternative vertical relations 
have been pursued by Catalonia and the Basque Country, such as direct relations with 
EU institutions.  
 
Catalonia and the Basque Country have engaged in many horizontal and vertical 
political relations, increasingly possible since the fall of the Franco regime in 1975. In 
this next section, the thesis argues that horizontal and vertical political relations 
surrounding immigrant integration policy have been formed by Catalonia and the 
Basque Country with the aim of pursuing increased opportunities and gaining 
enhanced political autonomy. 
 
 
The active formation of horizontal and vertical relations 
 
As the previous section on the Catalan and Basque immigrant integration policies 
purported, a greater level of political autonomy is desired by these subnational 
entities. For example, the integration plans of Catalonia and the Basque Country 
extensively declare their inability to socially include many immigrants because of the 
inferior political rights of immigrants within Spain. While not the crux of this thesis, it 
could be further suggested that citizenship law is of interest to the subnational entities. 
That being said, it appears that the creation of integration policies is only the tip of the 
iceberg for the interest on immigration competencies for Catalonia and the Basque 
Country. These subnational entities have created multiple integration policies, which 
represent a political voice of how these subnational entities conceptualise how foreign 
immigrants fit into their subnational territories and political autonomy campaigns. 
However, integration policy is not the only avenue so far utilised by Catalonia and the 
Basque Country in the pursuit of greater integration policy competencies.  
 
Catalonia and the Basque Country have had long standing relations with the Spanish 
state. While there have been periods throughout history where Catalonia and the 
Basque Country have enjoyed significant political autonomy, the majority of modern 
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Spanish history shows that a balance of power has been struck between the Spanish 
state and these subnations. Like all relations, though, elements of political power have 
played a crucial role in the relationship between the central state and the subnational 
entities. Given its political might, the Spanish state has been able to use its national 
status to assert power over the subnational entities, choosing whether it will acquire 
further political power from or grant additional political autonomy to the subnational 
entities. Presently, Spain’s political actions are protected by the international 
Westphalian political structure. As the Westphalian principle of national sovereignty 
enables nations to act as sole sovereign within their political territories, remaining 
solely responsible for their domestic matters, Catalonia and the Basque Country have 
been forced to enter into tactful relations with Spain in order to further their 
subnational political autonomy campaigns. While these relationships are often met 
with trends of give-or-take, they have also been met with great difficultly, and at times 
outright hostility.  
 
Both Catalonia and the Basque Country have had some success in establishing their 
political autonomy campaigns within the national territory. For instance, during the 
process of democratisation after the death of General Franco, Catalonia and the 
Basque Country were given the opportunity to author their own political statutes and 
were awarded the label of historic community, which gave them (along with Galicia) 
more politically autonomous rights than other autonomous communities within Spain. 
Of course, the Spanish state retained particular rights of their own, rights which are 
commonly classified as ‘high-level’ policy and include competencies such as national 
defense, immigration and citizenship. 
 
While an increase in political autonomy occurred with the democratisation of Spain, 
Catalonia and the Basque Country have demanded further political autonomy that has 
yet to be achieved in their relations with the Spanish state. Venue-shopping activities 
have been actively pursued by Catalonia and the Basque Country with the aim of 
heightened political recognition. The first example of horizontal relations can be 
found in 2003, when Generalitat ministers, including Artus Mas
70
, met with ministers 
from the Quebec government in a meeting centered on the issue of new immigration 
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 Artur Mas was the Prime Minister of Catalonia's Generalitat from 2001-2003. 
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trends in the respective subnational entities (Davis, 2009). The Generalitat’s meeting 
with Quebec officials concerning immigration is significant, as the Canadian central 
government devolved formal immigration competencies to Quebec in 1991
71
. Quebec, 
then, may be perceived as a figure of inspiration for subnational entities who desire 
the level of political devolution that Quebec has acquired. This perceived inspiration 
is evident in the example with the Generalitat’s meeting with Quebec officials, as any 
increase in formal competencies, such as immigration policy would equate to a 
generalised increase in subnational autonomy – a major aim of Catalonia’s.   
 
Meetings amongst Catalan and Quebec officials have been common, with the meeting 
in 2003 only the start of this fruitful horizontal relationship. Indeed, immigration and 
integration matters are an opportune issue for Catalonia and Quebec to meet, as both 
subnational entities share very similar immigrant rates (Davis, 2009).  A further 
meeting, in May of 2008, was held in the form of a conference amongst leading 
immigration experts from the subnational entities of Catalonia, Flanders and Quebec 
in Barcelona. During this conference, the immigration experts discussed their 
respective entity’s policy on integration, and where possible, immigration, policy 
(Davis, 2009). 
 
In late 2008, a second meeting between Catalonia’s Generalitat and Quebec officials 
took place in Barcelona. This meeting was entitled the Forum on Management of 
Immigration and Diversity in Quebec and Canada. The forum was set up as an 
informative meeting whereby the Canadian model of decentralised immigration 
policy was explained, with special attention on how the decentralised model could be 
translated in the Spanish context with “... emphasis placed on the fact that the 
Canadian model recognises the powers of different provinces in the area of the 
selection and integration of immigrants ...” (Barcelona Center for International 
Studies, 2008, p. 1). Indeed, one key discussion at the forum was the political power 
Quebec holds in managing their own immigration process and how this greatly assists 
in the integration of immigrants within Quebec.  This forum was funded by the 
Generalitat and displays the Generalitat’s interest in other subnational entities' 
political competencies and how the issue of immigration may translate into increased 
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political competencies, and hence subnational political autonomy. As Spain holds 
immigration policy and law at the state level, the Quebec immigration case is not a 
reality for any autonomous community within Spain. The forum's findings suggested 
that work could be done on “establishing an agreement between the State and the 
autonomous communities that would increase the latter's powers in the area of 
immigration” (Barcelona Centre for International Studies, 2008, p. 1). This forum 
operated as an insight into how Catalonia views Quebec as a subnational example of 
increased political autonomy, resulting from the management of both integration and 
immigration competencies. 
 
The thesis now turns to the venue shopping relations at the vertical level. Vertical 
relations are awkward in reality as supranational entities very often uphold the 
sovereign rights of the state. Subnational entities’ political ambitions, no matter how 
actively they seek out political relations with supranational entities, are easily halted if 
they, in any way, threaten state sovereignty. Vertical relations, then, are often used as a 
way for subnational entities to work alongside states, in a new context, often outside 
the state territory.  
 
The first vertical relation example may be illustrated in the quasi-political institution, 
the Patronat Catalá Pro Europa, created by Catalonia's Generalitat in 1982, which 
brings together Catalan government officials and representatives from a wide variety 
of public sectors (such as universities and business leaders) to operate Catalonia's 
embassy in Brussels (Roller & Sloat, 2002). Brussels represents an opportune setting 
for subnational entities to be able to pursue such autonomy as it is the headquarters of 
EU and provides endless supranational and subnational institutions and interests. 
Patronat Catalá Pro Europa operates as a vertical relation between Catalonia and the 
EU, in which it promotes the participation of Catalonia in the institution of the EU 
(Downs, 2003). This quasi-institution is worth exploring, as it not only represents an 
example of Catalonia's venue shopping at the EU-level, but also displays innovative 
ways by which Catalonia is portraying itself to the supranational community. 
Although Catalonia's embassy in Brussels, and those elsewhere, are not official 
embassies as such, it does conduct business in matters of tourism, business interests 
and other quasi-diplomatic activities (Nagel, 2004; Roller & Sloat, 2002). Hence, 
these ‘embassies’ represent a separate institutional body from that of official Spanish 
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embassies and gain direct interaction with national and subnational actors which are 
not fully or directly monitored by the Spanish state. Davis (2009) explains that the 
concept behind creating these quasi-embassies was put forth by Jordi Pujol with the 
aim of disseminating information about Catalan language, culture and Catalan 
industries which had significant position vacancies (Brightly, 1999; Davis, 2009). The 
rationale for this concept was that Catalonia receives the most foreign immigrants of 
all the Spanish autonomous communities, better information dissemination and visa 
coordination
72
 were necessary to ensure smoother integration processes for foreign 
immigrants (Davis, 2009). Although many of these quasi-embassies have ended up 
closing due to the uncoordinated behaviour between the Catalan and Spanish 
embassies, this example represents a clear example of a subnational entity taking 
control of its diplomatic, economic and political interactions in a manner of bypassing 
the state (Davis, 2009).  
 
A further vertical relation example can be found at the Pompeu Fabra University in 
Barcelona, which in 2009 formed a Master's programme in Immigration Management. 
Using the EU's European Space of Higher Education (ESHE) as its accreditor, the 
programme was created by the Centre for International Information and 
Documentation in Barcelona [CIDOB] and the European Institute of the 
Mediterranean [IEmed]. The aim of this programme is to “train experts to be able to 
correctly manage the demands on administrations and organisation created by the 
arrival of people with different origins and characteristics...” in order for the 
“Generalitat of Catalonia to train immigration technicians to a high professional 
level...” (Barcelona Centre for International Studies, 2009, p. 1). This Master's 
programme may be viewed a vertical relation between Catalonia, the ESHE and the 
IEmed, whereby the ESHE and IEmed are privately engaging with Catalonia under 
the competency of education. The interesting point here is that the educational 
programme in which these three entities are engaged centres the issue of immigration, 
a competency which Catalonia has not been granted from the Spanish state.  However, 
as the implementation of such a programme might benefit Catalan autonomy efforts 
by having the possibility of increasing its immigration competencies, Catalonia, in 
this example is purposely using the IEmed and the EU's ESHE to form vertical 
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relationships with supranational organisations, as a strategy of increasing its 
participation in such a formal political competency.  
 
The next vertical relation example can be found in Govan’s (2009) article in which 
Barcelona is tipped to be the future main base for the EU’s Union for the 
Mediterranean project. This project is being constructed in an effort to consolidate 
with North African states as a means of improving future development. As many 
North African states constitute the states of origin of some of the largest foreign 
immigrant groups present in Spain, and in particular Catalonia, Barcelona would be in 
an exceptionally strategic position to participate in, and thus influence, the Spanish 
state’s immigration strategies with North Africa. The Union for the Mediterranean, 
then, may prove to be a relation which could increase Catalonia’s participation in 
significant international immigration policy.  
 
Finally, the Basque Country has also engaged in vertical relations. Although 
substantially less literature exists concerning Basque relations with supranational 
entities in comparison with Catalonia, there are some markers that the Basque 
Country is actively interacting in vertical relations. For example, the Basque Country 
also has quasi-embassies within Brussels and other international capitals, which work 
as “... a network of overseas offices to promote trade and Basque culture” (Brightly, 
1999, p. 4). Although foreign immigration has not yet affected the Basque Country as 
significantly as Catalonia, the Basque Country has started to look abroad to promote 
its culture, which in fact, could easily inform potential foreign immigrants about 
Basque culture; about which the Spanish government may not have provided.  
 
There are critics of venue shopping theory who assert that political power remains 
largely with the states and that alternative political relations will not yield the kind of 
enhanced political power or self-determination for which subnational entities are 
seeking (Carter, 2003; Coates, 1998; Guibernau, 2006; Sasse, 2006). For example, 
Nagel (2004) argues that although subnational entities have been allowed access to 
the EU's Council of Ministers as part of the Maastrict Treaty, they may only have 
representative status if their respective member state permits it. Coates (1998) goes on 
to state that even though the Maastrict Treaty allows the participation of subnational 
entities in the EU Council, Spain has not once given the opportunity to the Basque 
 50
Country. There are also those critics who are skeptical of whether vertical relations 
should be pursued by subnational entities to further their political ambitions. For 
example, Guibernau (2006) believes that as far as the EU is concerned, Catalonia's 
political aspirations are simply a matter between Catalonia and Spain, and purports 
that Catalonia should remain as a Spanish internal issue, therefore having no 
relevance to EU involvement. Furthermore, Carter (2003) has stated that it is not that 
subnational entities can simply subvert the nation and go straight to the supranational 
level, as subnational entities remain territorially bound within their respective national 
borders. Carter (2003) believes that the subnational entities must spend as much 
attention to the subnational-national relationships as on subnational-supranational 
relationships in order to foster any progress in their political autonomy campaigns. 
Lastly, there has also been a general disenchantment with the EU as a place for 
subnational entities to participate equally. For example, Roller & Sloat (2002) explain 
that Catalonia has not disregarded its relations with the state of Spain and continues to 
work at the subnational-national level to promote its subnational autonomy campaign.  
 
The aim of introducing venue shopping practices, however, is by no means an 
abandonment of the subnational entities’ relationships with their respective states. 
Indeed, Catalonia and the Basque Country have maintained positive relations with the 
state of Spain, while also participating in alternative methods of promoting their 
political autonomy. While the picture of Catalan and Basque political strategy is 
neither one thing nor the other, it remains clear that these subnational entities “… are 
becoming more adept at 'playing' the game even if not always 'winning' it” (Roller & 



















Catalonia and the Basque Country have been used as case studies to analyse the 
political stratagem of contemporary subnational autonomy campaigns. These entities 
were chosen based upon their unique subnational identities, their long-standing 
political autonomy campaigns within a centralised state and their experience with 
contemporary global trends. Firstly, this thesis aimed to demonstrate a comparative 
analysis of subnational political autonomy campaigns, whereby the subnational level 
was assessed for its political relationship with the state. As both Catalonia and the 
Basque Country are within the political and territorial jurisdiction of the Spanish state, 
a comparative approach was possible.  
 
To understand each subnational entity’s contemporary position on the spectrum of 
political autonomy aspirations, Chapter 2 explored the historical realities of Catalonia 
and the Basque Country as a background necessary for understanding the specific 
political realities that are particular to each subnational entity. Although both 
Catalonia and the Basque Country have the status of ‘historic community’ within 
Spain, allowing them enhanced political autonomy in relation to the other autonomous 
communities of Spain, their pathways of gaining such statuses were shown to be 
drastically different. Beginning in the early 18
th
 century, Catalonia had been a target 
of cultural and political suppression by central Spain. Indeed, Catalonia was 
historically a highly self-sustaining political entity, due to its advanced economy and 
the wide use of Catalan, which promoted Catalonia as a highly capable political 
entity. However, as Catalonia had long been assumed as within the bounds of the 
Spanish sovereign territory, the Spanish state found that it could not tolerate 
significant degrees of political autonomy by Catalonia, and, thus, socio-political 
suppression came to characterise the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish 
state for many centuries.  
 
The Basque Country also had a very unique relationship with the Spanish state. 
Although assumed as within the bounds of the Spanish territory, the Basque Country 
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retained a significant degree of political autonomy
73
 until the late 19
th
 century. With 
the advent of the capitalist mining industry, the Basque socio-political structure was 
disestablished due to the abolition of the Basque fuero system. This historical 
background was found to be significant to the contemporary political autonomy aims 
of the respective subnational entities, as, in general, Catalonia is concerned about its 
socio-cultural autonomy, whereas the Basque Country is highly invested in the 
autonomous fiscal management. 
 
Relations between the state and the subnational entities have remained quite stable 
since Spain’s transition to democracy starting in 1975. While political stability 
throughout Spain would generally be judged as something positive, for subnational 
entities aiming for enhanced political autonomy, a stable relationship between with 
the state is not all positive. Thus, Catalonia and the Basque Country have equated the 
state’s lexicon of stability as political stagnation, and have continued to demand 
greater self-determination. 
 
This thesis used the phenomenon of international immigration as the subject which 
significantly influences the political tide within Spain. Indeed, the increased 
movement of people across borders offers a situation in which the socio-political 
context of Spain is changed by external influences rather than internal ones. This 
thesis was interested more specifically in the intersection at which foreign immigrants 
and subnational entities meet. From the outset, one might assume that the arrival of 
foreign immigrants into subnational entities would solicit automatic conflict. Indeed, 
it could be possible for tension to exist in a situation whereby a non-dominant 
political entity is actively attempting to preserve its minority socio-political identity 
within the greater Spain, while the demographics of its subnation is being altered by 
an influx of foreign immigrants, most of whom are largely unaware of the socio-
political histories of the subnational entity they are entering, and whose immigration 
status is determined by the Spanish state. Of course this potential conflict has not been 
absent from reality. Indeed, immigrants were long perceived as contributing to the 
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cultural dilution of the Basque Country (Shafir, 1995). While reactions towards 
foreign immigrants have historically differed between Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, the contemporary political landscape has witnessed a remarkable new tact.  
 
As immigrants commonly enter subnational entities lacking a substantial 
understanding of the political relationships between the subnational entities and the 
central state, one may judge this situation as having the potential to threaten the 
preservation of traditional, subnational identities and the promotion of subnational 
political autonomy. However, immigrants also offer a novel opportunity as a political 
instrument which subnational entities may use to solicit their demands for increased 
political autonomy. This thesis demonstrated that Catalonia and the Basque Country 
have taken this contemporary approach to the issue of foreign immigration. Through 
the development of robust integration policies, Catalonia and the Basque Country 
have illustrated their respective subnational identities through which immigrants may 
more fully integrate. This strategy was found within the most recent Catalan and 
Basque integration policies. Through an analysis of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country’s respective integration policies, Chapter 4 uncovered Catalan appeals for 
autonomous border control under the pretense of more effective control of the foreign 
immigration trends in its territory and Basque demands for authority of the 
administration of citizenship under the pretense of enhancing the political rights and 
integration of foreign immigrants. Both of these political themes, though under the 
guise of improving the integration of foreign immigrants, represent significant 
demands for increased formal competencies from Catalonia and the Basque Country, 
which, in turn, would result in a greater level of subnational political autonomy for 
their subnational entities.  
 
The final method in which Catalonia and the Basque Country were evaluated as 
promoting their subnational autonomy campaigns was through venue shopping 
tactics, whereby Catalonia and the Basque Country have forged informal political 
relations with other subnational entities and with supranational institutions. Under the 
pretence of improving their respective immigrant integration strategies, Catalonia and 
the Basque Country have formed diplomatic bridges with other subnational entities, 
such as Quebec, which offer lessons on how heightened formal competencies can be 
established under immigration policy. Diplomatic relations at the supranational level 
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were also illustrated and revealed interesting questions regarding the influence of 
supranational institutions on the national level.   
 
Though the sovereign state system continues to dominate the international political 
structure, and state-controlled immigration policy continues to affect subnational 
entities, Catalonia and the Basque Country demonstrate how subnational entities are 
enhancing their informal political competencies by producing high-quality integration 
policies promoting a subnational ideal to the international community and engaging in 
calculated political relationships aimed to further their subnational political autonomy 
campaigns. Both stratagems represent the multitude of diverse political engagements 
which subnational entities have constructed with the aim of promoting their political 
autonomy campaigns.  
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